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PUSHING EXECUTION OVER THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LINE: FORCIBLE 
MEDICATION OF CONDEMNED INMATES 
AND THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court has declared it unconstitutional to 
execute death row inmates who are too insane to understand the fact of 
their pending execution and the reasons behind it. The Court has not 
specified, however, what mechanisms a state may constitutionally employ 
to render such an inmate sane enough to execute. This Note addresses 
whether states may forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to insane 
death row inmates in order to restore their competence for execution. It 
concludes that states violate both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments when execution is preceded by forcible medication with antipsy-
chotic drugs. First, as soon as an execution date is set, a forcible medica-
tion program ceases to meet the constitutional requirement that it be 
“medically appropriate” because it no longer comports with the ethical 
standards of the medical profession, and it subverts treatment into a de-
grading punishment unique to incompetent death row inmates. Second, 
this scheme violates inmates’ rights to due process because the state’s in-
terest in execution does not outweigh both an inmate’s privacy interest 
and the state’s own interest in preserving the integrity of the medical 
community when execution will be replaced by a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole. 
Introduction 
 On average, inmates on death row in the United States spend over 
ten years awaiting execution, and some have remained on death row 
for over twenty years.1 Condemned inmates are generally isolated from 
others, excluded from prison educational and employment programs, 
and severely restricted in visitation and exercise privileges.2 Added to 
this isolation, the lives of those on death row are continually overshad-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Time on Death Row, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/time-death-row (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
2 Id. Inmates may spend up to twenty-three hours each day alone in their cells. Id. 
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owed by the questions of if and when execution will take place.3 Given 
these conditions, it is not uncommon for death row inmates, deter-
mined competent at the time they committed their crime and 
throughout criminal proceedings, to become incompetent by reason of 
insanity while on death row.4 
 Over twenty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court formally declared 
that it was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to execute defendants 
who were too insane to understand the fact of their pending execution 
and the reasons behind it.5 This holding was based on a long-standing 
prohibition against this practice in the common law system inherited 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id.; see Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 475–76 (1989). In this 
landmark judgment, the European Court of Human Rights established that extradition of 
a young German national to the United States to face charges of capital murder violated 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights guaranteeing the right against 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Id. at 478. Though Article 3 was not interpreted as 
generally prohibiting the death penalty, the court found that certain circumstances relat-
ing to a death sentence could give rise to a violation of Article 3. Id. at 474. In the court’s 
view, those circumstances were present in Virginia’s death penalty scheme due to the aver-
age length of time (six to eight years) inmates spent subject to the stress of the death row 
environment: 
However well-intentioned and even potentially beneficial is the provision of 
the complex of post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the consequence is that 
the condemned prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on 
death row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present 
shadow of death . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [H]aving regard to the very long period of time spent on death row in 
such extreme conditions, with the ever-present and mounting anguish of 
awaiting execution of the death penalty, and to the personal circumstances of 
the applicant, especially his age and mental state at the time of the offence, 
the applicant’s extradition to the United States would expose him to a real 
risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. 
Id. at 475–76, 478. 
4 See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In the 
history of murder, the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not 
a rare phenomenon.”); Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 
47 Ark. L. Rev. 361, 371 (1994) (discussing how the “problem” of condemned prisoners 
becoming incompetent prior to execution seems to be “an inherent product of a judicial 
system which tells an individual he should die for his crime, places him in an isolated and 
restricted environment, and allows for considerable delay before the sentence is ever car-
ried out”). Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is estimated that five to ten per-
cent of people on death row have a serious mental illness. Position Statement 54: Death Pen-
alty and People with Mental Illness, Mental Health Am. ( June 11, 2006), http://www.nmha. 
org/go/position-statements/54. 
5 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). 
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from England,6 understood to be incorporated by the Framers into the 
Eighth Amendment at the time of its enactment.7 Currently, however, 
this long-standing tradition against executing the insane is complicated 
by modern advances in psychiatry and psychotropic medication, which 
have enabled the insane to be rendered competent for execution in 
ways never contemplated by the Framers.8 This conflict between tradi-
tion and modern science engenders novel Eighth Amendment and due 
process issues, as well as professional and ethical dilemmas for the 
medical personnel treating condemned inmates to ready them for exe-
cution.9 
 States retain broad discretion in determining when an individual is 
incompetent for execution.10 Once a defendant has been determined 
to be incompetent, state legislation generally calls for a stay of execu-
tion until that individual regains his or her sanity.11 To facilitate this re-
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. at 406–08. The Court demonstrated how the practice was condemned by 
common law in 1789 as there was no authority condoning execution of the insane at Eng-
lish common law. See id. at 406–07 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *24–25 
(“idiots” and “lunatics” shall not be executed)). 
7 See id. at 408–10; see also Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 147 (2004) (noting that both the drafters of the English cruel 
and unusual punishments clause and drafters of the American clause were guided by the 
same common-law understanding). 
8 See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding state could 
constitutionally execute death row inmate rendered competent through forcible medica-
tion). Charles Singleton, who during his twenty-five years on death row manifested paranoid 
schizophrenia, was executed by lethal injection by the state of Arkansas on January 6, 2004 
while on antipsychotic medication that controlled his psychotic symptoms. Alan A. Stone, 
Condemned Prisoner Treated and Executed, Psychiatric Times, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1. 
9 See Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 439–41 (6th Cir. 2009); Singleton, 319 F.3d at 
1023–27; State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755, 761 (La. 1992). 
10 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960–61 (2007); Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. 
11 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506 (2006) (“If the individual is found incompetent 
due to mental illness, [to understand the nature and reasons for that punishment,] the 
Governor shall order that appropriate mental health treatment be provided. The Director 
of the Department of Correction may order a reevaluation of the competency of the indi-
vidual as circumstances may warrant.”); Cal. Penal Code § 3704 (West 2000) (requiring 
warden to stay execution if condemned is “insane” until court determines “defendant has 
recovered his sanity”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.07 (West 2001) (requiring that execution 
shall be stayed “if the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the men-
tal capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on him 
or her,” and reinstituted when condemned “has been restored to sanity”); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 22-4006 (2007) (requiring that, if judge determines condemned is “insane,” execution 
shall be suspended; if anytime thereafter judge has “sufficient reason to believe that the 
convict has become sane, the judge again shall determine the sanity of the convict . . . . 
Proceedings pursuant to this section may continue to be held at such times as the district 
judge orders until it is determined either that such convict is sane or incurably insane.”); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-57 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (providing that court shall suspend 
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covery proactively, may a state forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs? 
Legislation is not specific on this point,12 and the few courts to decide 
the issue have reached different conclusions.13 Is it appropriate to leave 
discretion in this matter to state legislatures, or, conversely, are states 
constitutionally obligated to mitigate a death sentence to a sentence of 
life imprisonment when an inmate’s competence hinges on a state-
imposed medication regimen?14 
 Consideration of the constitutionality of forcibly medicating a 
condemned inmate must begin from awareness and understanding of 
the particularly intrusive character of antipsychotic medication.15 An-
                                                                                                                      
execution if condemned “is a person with mental illness,” and that if during commitment, 
“the appropriate official at the state hospital considers the offender to be sane under this 
subsection . . . [t]he court then shall conduct a hearing on the sanity of the offender”); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-2537 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring that, if a commission finds 
the convict mentally incompetent, the judge shall suspend his or her execution until the 
commission, meeting annually, subsequently finds the convicted person competent); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:24 (2003) (“The governor, with the advice of the council, may respite 
from time to time, for stated periods, the execution of a sentence of death upon a convict 
. . . if it appears to their satisfaction that the convict has become insane . . . .”); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 137.463 (2009) (“Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, if the court 
finds that the defendant suffers from a mental condition that prevents the defendant from 
comprehending the reasons for the sentence of death or its implications, the court may 
not issue a death warrant until such time as the court, after appropriate inquiries, finds 
that the defendant is able to comprehend the reasons for the sentence of death and its 
implications.”); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-27A-22, -24 (Supp. 2010) (requiring that, if 
condemned “does not appear to be mentally competent to be executed,” warden “shall 
notify the Governor, the secretary of corrections, and the sentencing court”; if sentencing 
court finds condemned is not “mentally competent to be executed,” execution shall be 
suspended until condemned “is mentally competent to be executed” with the sentencing 
court reviewing the condemned’s “mental condition at least once every six months during 
the period that the execution of sentence is suspended”). 
12 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Maryland is the only state that elaborates 
on this point. See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-904(a)(2)–(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & 
Supp. 2009). Maryland provides, “An inmate is not incompetent . . . merely because the 
inmate’s competence depends on continuing treatment, including the use of medication.” 
Id. § 3-904(b). Maryland also provides that when an inmate is found incompetent, the 
sentence of death shall be replaced by a sentence of life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole. See id. § 3-904(h). 
13 See, e.g., Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026, 1027 (holding that otherwise valid forcible medica-
tion regimen does not become unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments once execution date is set); Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761, 771 (holding that forcibly medi-
cating to execute violates state constitutional right to privacy and prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993) (holding that 
forcibly medicating to execute violates state constitutional right of privacy). 
14 See infra notes 165–264 and accompanying text. 
15 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990) (describing the Court’s under-
standing of the intrusive character of antipsychotic medication, particularly in the context of 
forcible administration); see also Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Mental Health Medica-
tions 2–3 (rev. ed. 2008), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/men- 
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tipsychotic medication is intended to alter the chemical balance in a 
patient’s brain, spurring changes in his or her cognitive process.16 This 
process often results in undesirable physical intrusions on a patient’s 
body, as antipsychotic medication often gives rise to serious, even fatal, 
side effects.17 Furthermore, those individuals whose only hope for suc-
cessful treatment rests on antipsychotic medication are seriously ill in-
dividuals.18 For example, schizophrenia is a “chronic, severe and dis-
abling brain disorder” that results in hallucinations, delusions, thought 
disorders, and movement disorders.19 A combination of antipsychotic 
medication and psychosocial treatment can help many of those af-
flicted manage their symptoms so they can function, but most will have 
to cope with symptoms throughout their lives.20 
 This Note discusses the constitutional issues that arise when states 
forcibly medicate incompetent condemned inmates to render them 
competent for execution.21 Based on the general Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel methods of execution, the particular exemp-
tion of the insane from the death penalty, and circumstances in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that states are authorized to forcibly 
medicate prisoners, this Note concludes that states violate both the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when executing a prisoner whose 
                                                                                                                      
tal-health-medications/nimh-mental-health-medications.pdf (discussing side effects related 
to antipsychotic medication, including effects that cause health and metabolic complications 
as well as effects related to physical movement). 
16 Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. 
17 Id. at 229–30. The Court described possible side effects of antipsychotic medication, 
including acute dystonia (a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat or 
eyes), akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by the inability to sit still), neuro-
leptic malignant syndrome (a relatively rare condition which can lead to death from car-
diac dysfunction) and tardive dyskinesia (a sometimes irreversible neurological disorder 
characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements or various muscles, especially 
those around the face). Id. 
18 See Nat’l Instit. of Mental Health, Schizophrenia 1–3 (rev. ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia/schizophrenia-booket-2009. 
pdf. 
19 Nat’l Instit. of Mental Health, supra note 18, at 1–3. 
 People with the disorder may hear voices other people don’t hear. They 
may believe other people are reading their minds, controlling their thoughts, 
or plotting to harm them. This can terrify people with the illness and make 
them withdrawn or extremely agitated. 
 People with schizophrenia may not make sense when they talk. They may 
sit for hours without moving or talking. Sometimes people with schizophrenia 
seem perfectly fine until they talk about what they are really thinking. 
Id. at 1. 
20 Id. 
21 See infra notes 165–264 and accompanying text. 
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competence hinges on a forced regimen of antipsychotic drugs.22 First, 
as soon as an execution date is set, a forcible medication program 
ceases to meet the constitutional requirement that it be “medically ap-
propriate” because it no longer comports with the ethical standards of 
the medical profession and it subverts treatment into a degrading pun-
ishment unique to incompetent death row inmates.23 Second, this 
scheme ceases to meet the constitutional requirement that it further a 
sufficiently important government interest because the state’s interest 
in execution does not outweigh both the inmate’s privacy interest and 
the state’s own interest in preserving the integrity of the medical com-
munity when execution will be replaced by a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole.24 As such, execution preceded by forcible medica-
tion with antipsychotic drugs unduly violates a condemned inmate’s 
liberty interest and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.25 
 Part I discusses the jurisprudence of cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment, and the application of “evolving 
standards of decency.”26 Part II particularly examines the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against execution of the insane.27 Part III 
summarizes U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding circumstances in 
which a state may forcibly medicate inmates with antipsychotic drugs.28 
Part IV examines the approaches taken by the few state and federal ap-
pellate courts that have addressed the issue of whether it is constitu-
tional to forcibly medicate a condemned inmate to restore competence 
for execution.29 Part V argues that, although it is too prescriptive to 
suppose that antipsychotic medication would never be sufficient to re-
store competence for execution, a state nonetheless imposes unconsti-
tutional punishment upon inmates when it seeks to forcibly medicate 
to facilitate execution, for such medication is not medically appropriate 
and does not further a sufficiently important government interest.30 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 187–264 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 201–252 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 253–264 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 165–264 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 47–74 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 75–106 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 107–164 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 165–264 and accompanying text. 
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I. Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and  
Unusual Punishment 
A. Prohibition Against Torturous Punishment Involving Severe  
and Gratuitous Pain 
 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment guarantees that states will not inflict torturous punishment 
involving severe or gratuitous pain.31 In the late 1800s, the U.S. Su-
preme Court stated that “punishments of torture” are forbidden under 
the Eighth Amendment, including punishments where the prisoner 
“was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in treason,” where the 
prisoner was “embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high trea-
son,” punishments including “public dissection in murder” and “burn-
ing alive in treason committed by a female,”32 as well as “burning at the 
stake, crucifixion, or breaking on the wheel.”33 These forms of punish-
ment, along with “all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” 
are surely forbidden.34 From the Court’s earliest cases, this interpreta-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment has been understood to apply 
not only to methods of punishment that inherently inflict severe physi-
cal pain, but also to those methods that inherently inflict severe mental 
pain.35 
                                                                                                                      
31 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
135–36 (1878) (“Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of 
the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not 
be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the 
same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.”). 
32 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135. 
33 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). 
34 See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) 
(determining that imprisonment for narcotics addition is excessive punishment); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (determining that expatriation is excessive punishment); 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910) (determining that twelve years in 
chains at hard and painful labor is excessive punishment). 
35 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice 
Brennan reaches his conclusion that the Eighth Amendment traditionally prohibits severe 
mental pain inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment by citing to Weems, 217 
U.S. at 372, where the Court noted that there may “be exercises of cruelty by laws other 
than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation,” and to Trop, 356 U.S. at 101, where 
the Court prohibited denationalization as a punishment though “[t]here may be involved 
no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture” since “[t]here is instead the total destruc-
tion of the individual’s status in organized society,” and concluded that denationalization 
“is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the 
political existence that was centuries in the development.” Id. at 271, 274 n.15. 
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 Drawing from the traditional prohibition against punishments of 
torture, cruelty in the context of execution has been articulated by the 
Court as follows: “Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the 
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there [is] 
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere 
extinguishment of life.”36 
B. Evolving Standards of Decency and the Dignity of Man 
 Over time, the Eighth Amendment’s protection has been extended 
beyond the traditional prohibition against punishments of torture to 
include punishments that are offensive to the “dignity of man, which is 
the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.”37 At a mini-
mum, this means that a particular punishment must not be “excessive” 
in that it “involve[s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or 
is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”38 Prohibiting 
excessive punishment assures that a prisoner will be treated as a mem-
ber of the human race, and not as an object to be “toyed with and dis-
carded” by the state.39 Nevertheless, a punishment will not be invali-
dated merely because the state could employ a less severe method; 
rather, to be invalidated, the punishment itself must involve physical or 
mental pain that offends basic human attributes.40 
 There is no hard and fast rule to guide courts deciding whether a 
particular punishment is cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amend-
ment is interpreted flexibly and “must draw its meaning from the evolv-
                                                                                                                      
36 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. 
37 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citation omitted); see also Furman, 408 
U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“At bottom . . . the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as 
it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. 
A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dig-
nity.”); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 
38 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
39 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 272–73. 
When we consider why [punishments inflicting torture] have been con-
demned . . . we realize that the pain involved is not the only reason. The true 
significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the human 
race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus 
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest 
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity. 
Id. 
40 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182–83; Furman, 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting); Louisi-
ana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446–47. 
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ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.”41 Evolving standards of decency may be found in state legislation, 
or other forms of objective evidence capable of reflecting the contem-
porary public attitude toward a particular sanction.42 There is, however, 
a subjective component to these standards, which requires the Court’s 
own judgment to be brought to bear when determining the acceptabil-
ity of a particular punishment.43 
 In recent years, the Court has invoked evolving standards of de-
cency to conclude that the imposition of the death penalty is dispropor-
tionate punishment as applied to certain crimes44 or to certain classes of 
offenders.45 A sentence of capital punishment is understood to be “lim-
ited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most seri-
ous crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them most deserving 
of execution.”46 
                                                                                                                      
41 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01; Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (noting that cruel and unusual pun-
ishment cannot be rigidly defined, because “[i]n the application of a constitution . . . our 
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be”). A progressing civili-
zation is understood to be one that seeks to temper means of capital punishment to pro-
vide greater respect for human dignity. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658 
(2008) (“It is an established principle that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the 
individual and thus moderation or restraint in the application of capital punishment.”). 
42 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 174 n.19. The Court was aware of the tension between the 
legislative and executive functions when deciphering “evolving standards of decency”: on 
the one hand, “legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen representatives pro-
vide one important means of ascertaining contemporary values,” while on the other hand 
the Eighth Amendment “was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legisla-
tive power.” Id. at 174 n.19. Some measure of judicial review is therefore necessary to 
guard against instances where state legislatures enact penal laws that, in the light of con-
temporary human knowledge, inflict cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 174. The Court 
therefore concluded that the judicial role in enforcing the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment must be limited but must be available because “the Eighth Amendment is a 
restraint upon the exercise of legislative power.” Id. Nonetheless, the Court must remain 
mindful that “[it] may not act as judges as [it] might as legislators.” Id. at 174–75. 
43 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
597 (1977)). 
44 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding a sentence of death 
for a murderer who did not intend to kill is grossly disproportionate and excessive pun-
ishment); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding a sentence of death for the crime of rape of an 
adult woman is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment). 
45 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that executing crimi-
nals under eighteen years of age at time of their capital crimes is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment prohibited by Eighth Amendment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that execut-
ing mentally retarded criminals is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Eighth 
Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1986) (holding that executing 
the insane is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
46 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
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II. Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Execution  
of the Insane 
 In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright, a divided U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from executing a prisoner 
who is insane.47 The plurality looked to both historical and contempo-
rary values to support its conclusion.48 First, as execution of the insane 
was condemned at common law in 1789, the Framers must have in-
tended the Eighth Amendment to ban the practice as well.49 Second, 
objective evidence of contemporary values found in state legislation 
indicated that the practice did not comport with contemporary notions 
of human dignity because no state permitted execution of the insane at 
the time.50 The Court reasoned that states had prohibited the practice 
for the same reasons it had been prohibited at common law—because 
execution of the insane provided no retributive value51 and offended 
fundamental notions of humanity.52 Thus, the plurality concluded that, 
whether compelled by the desire “to protect the condemned from fear 
and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of 
society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance,” exe-
cution of the insane was a punishment proscribed as unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual.53 
                                                                                                                      
47 477 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1986). 
48 Id. at 406–10. 
49 Id. at 405 (“There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment 
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.”). 
50 Id. at 408–09. 
51 Id. The Court noted that historically, execution of the insane was understood to 
serve no purpose because madness is its own punishment: furiosus solo furore punitur. Id. at 
407–08. The Court also cited to the belief that “the community’s quest for ‘retribution’ —
the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent ‘moral quality’ —is not 
served by execution of an insane person, which has a ‘lesser value’ than that of the crime 
for which he is to be punished.” Id. at 408 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. 
Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. Rev. 381, 387 (1962)). 
The Court then concluded that “today, no less than before, we may seriously question the 
retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been 
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.” Id. at 409. 
52 Id. at 407. The Court recognized religious underpinnings as a basis for the inhu-
manity of executing the insane: “[I]t is uncharitable to dispatch an offender into another 
world, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it.” Id. (citation and quotation omit-
ted). The Court then concluded that “the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at 
killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still 
vivid today.” Id. at 409. 
53 Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
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 Although the plurality prohibited execution of the insane, it did 
not endeavor to answer the critical question of what constitutes insan-
ity.54 The only guidance provided on this definitional issue is Justice 
Powell’s assertion, drawn from common law heritage and modern state 
practices, that those who are to be executed must be aware of the pun-
ishment they are about to suffer and why they are about to suffer it.55 
Justice Powell deemed this standard for sanity the appropriate constitu-
tional baseline because it fulfilled both the retributive and humanitar-
ian concerns identified by the plurality.56 First, as long as a defendant 
can perceive the connection between his crime and his punishment, 
the retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied.57 Second, as long as a 
defendant is aware that his death is approaching, he may prepare him-
self, mentally and spiritually, for death.58 
 The plurality opted to allow the states to set the procedural stan-
dards that would assure due process to inmates asserting competency 
claims.59 Justice Powell specified that procedures must allow for an im-
partial decisionmaker and an opportunity for the inmate to present his 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 416–17. 
55 Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. States have taken varied approaches to the definition of insanity: although some 
simply prohibit execution of ‘insane’ prisoners without defining insanity for this purpose, 
others attempt more precision by adopting the language used by Justice Powell in his con-
curring opinion. See Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Insanity: The Constitutional and 
Moral Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 
641, 646 n.33 (2009); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty 
and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 668, 673 
(2006) (“[E}xecution should be precluded when a prisoner lacks the capacity (i) to make a 
rational decision regarding whether to pursue post-conviction proceedings, (ii) to assist 
counsel in post-conviction adjudication, or (iii) to appreciate the meaning or purpose of 
an impending execution.”). 
59 Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. The Court held that Florida’s procedures for determining 
sanity of a death row prisoner were constitutionally deficient because they did not afford a 
“full and fair hearing” on the critical issue of competence to be executed. Id. at 410–12. 
The Court left enforcement to the states, but noted that states must, at the very least, select 
procedures that provide for redress for those with substantial claims, and encourage accu-
racy in the fact-finding determination. Id. at 417. Similarly, in 2002 in Atkins v. Virginia, the 
Court again allowed states to implement procedures to enforce its holding that execution 
of the mentally retarded was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual: 
Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall 
within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a na-
tional consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, with regard to in-
sanity, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to en-
force the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citation omitted). 
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own expert psychiatric evidence, but that beyond such basic require-
ments, states have “substantial leeway” to determine constitutionally ac-
ceptable procedures.60 
 In reaching this determination, Justice Powell made three basic 
points.61 First, he recognized the strong state interest in carrying out 
the punishment of one who has been validly convicted of a capital 
crime and sentenced to death.62 In his view, the issue in this sort of 
claim is “not whether, but when” the inmate’s execution may take place.63 
Second, Justice Powell noted that an inmate who pleads incompetence 
for execution is not operating on a blank slate because he must have 
been judged competent to stand trial.64 Thus, the state is entitled to 
presume that the inmate retains sanity, and may require substantial evi-
dence of insanity to “trigger the hearing process.”65 Third, Justice Pow-
ell observed that determining sanity is an essentially subjective judg-
ment that depends primarily on “expert analysis in a discipline fraught 
with ‘subtleties and nuances.’”66 Under such circumstances, an adver-
                                                                                                                      
60 Ford, 477 U.S. at 427. As a result of the leeway offered, states have come up with vary-
ing procedures for defining and determining competence for execution. See Henry F. 
Fradella, Competing Views on the Quagmire of Synthetically Restoring Competency to Be Executed, 
41 Crim L. Bull. 447, 448 (2005) (“[T]he lack of uniformity in the approach to compe-
tency to be executed, coupled with the inherent ambiguities of clinical assessment has led 
the process of determining competency for execution to be called ‘a game of chance’ by 
some commentators.”); see also Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law 
and Psychiatry, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 35, 60–61 (1985); Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Com-
ment, State v. Perry: Louisiana’s Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between 
a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1193, 1199–1204 (1993); 
Rhonda K. Jenkins, Comment, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the Purpose of Execution, 
20 S. Ill. U. L.J. 149, 167 (1995). See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice: Mental Health 7-5.6, -5.7 (1989). 
61 Ford, 477 U.S. at 425. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. Justice Powell further elaborated on this point: “It is of course true that some de-
fendants may lose their mental faculties and never regain them, and thus avoid execution 
altogether. My point is only that if petitioner is cured of his disease, the State is free to 
execute him.” Id. at 425 n.5. 
64 Id. at 425–26. The Court has articulated the standard for competence to stand trial 
as follows: 
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that the defendant is oriented 
to time and place and has some recollection of events . . . the test must be 
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (citation and quotation omitted). 
65 Ford, 477 U.S. at 426. 
66 Id. 
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sarial judicial proceeding would be less effective at making proper 
medical decisions than would an administrative council.67 
 Over twenty years after Ford was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court 
clarified Justice Powell’s definition of sanity in Panetti v. Quarterman in 
2007 by introducing a distinction between “mere awareness” and “ra-
tional understanding” of the reason for execution.68 The Court held 
that only the latter could establish the requisite competence for execu-
tion under the principles of Ford.69 
 In so holding, the Court overruled a decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had held that an inmate is necessar-
ily competent for execution if he is aware that he committed the crime, 
that he will be executed, and that the reason the state has given for the 
execution is his commission of the crimes in question.70 The Supreme 
Court determined this standard to be deficient insofar as it would treat a 
prisoner’s delusions as irrelevant to questions of mental competence.71 
 Although the Court rejected the standard followed by the Fifth 
Circuit, it again declined to articulate a rule governing all competency 
determinations.72 Rather, it remanded the case to the district court to 
determine the extent to which the delusions distorted the inmate’s 
perceptions of reality.73 In requiring consideration of this issue, the 
Court did not substantively alter the Ford standard but rather clarified 
how it should be understood.74 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. (“Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed 
protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical deci-
sions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be 
more illusory than real.” (quoting Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979))). 
68 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007) (“A prisoner’s awareness of the 
State’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it. Ford 
does not foreclose inquiry into the latter.”). 
69 See id. at 960. 
70 Id. at 956. 
71 Id. at 960. The Court reasoned that refusing to consider evidence of delusions was to 
“mistake Ford’s holding and its logic” because “[g]ross delusions stemming from a severe 
mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a 
context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.” Id. 
72 Id. at 960–61. 
73 Id. at 961–62. On remand, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 
held that, despite the fact that “Panetti was mentally ill when he committed his crime and 
continues to be mentally ill today,” he possessed “both a factual and rational understand-
ing of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the 
two.” Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *37 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 26, 2008). The district court concluded, “[I]f any mentally ill person is competent to 
be executed for his crimes, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti.” Id. 
74 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962. But see id. at 978–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the 
majority is imposing a new constitutional standard for determining competence because 
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III. Rendering Criminal Defendants Competent Through 
Antipsychotic Drugs 
 Neither Ford v. Wainwright nor Panetti v. Quarterman broached the 
issue of whether inmates may be rendered competent for execution 
through forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.75 Part III of this 
Note discusses the partial precedent that may be found in U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions holding forced administration of antipsychotic drugs a 
constitutionally acceptable means of rendering inmates competent for 
other purposes.76 
A. Washington v. Harper: Forcible Medication for Prison Safety 
 In 1989, in Washington v. Harper, the U.S. Supreme Court consid-
ered a suit challenging a Washington state prison policy that authorized 
forcible medication of an insane inmate with antipsychotic drugs against 
his will and without a judicial hearing.77 The Court recognized that an 
inmate “possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”78 Nonetheless, the Court held that, given 
the exigencies of the prison environment, a state may medicate an in-
mate with a serious mental illness against his will “if the inmate is dan-
gerous to himself or others, and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical 
interest.”79 The Court further held that a prison regulation authorizing 
such forcible medication is constitutionally valid if reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.80 Such a regulation need not require a 
                                                                                                                      
nothing in the Ford opinion “addresses what to do when a prisoner knows the reason for 
his execution but does not ‘rationally understand’ it”). 
75 See generally Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 405 (1986). 
76 See infra notes 77–106 and accompanying text. 
77 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990). 
78 Id. at 221–22; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 
(1990) (concluding that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is so rooted in 
our history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
79 Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. 
80 See id. at 224–25. The Court stated that it applies the same “reasonableness stan-
dard” to “all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitu-
tional rights.” Id. That reasonableness standard, first articulated in the Court’s 1987 deci-
sion in Turner v. Safely, considers the following factors: first, whether there is a rational 
connection between the prison regulation and the “legitimate government interest” it 
purports to serve; second, what “impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
right will have on guards and other inmates” and on prison resources generally; and third, 
 
2010] Forcible Medication of Condemned Inmates and the Constitution 1293 
judicial hearing to comport with due process so long as the nonjudicial 
mechanisms employed contain sufficient procedural safeguards to ap-
propriately balance the prisoner’s significant liberty interest against the 
government’s safety interest.81 
 The Court concluded that, although the individual and govern-
ment interests at stake were both substantial,82 the inmate was validly 
subjected to forcible medication pursuant to prison policy because 
the policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 
and contained sufficient procedural safeguards to protect the in-
mate’s liberty interests.83 Specifically, the Court determined that the 
policy met the reasonability criterion because it applied exclusively to 
inmates who posed a significant danger to themselves or others due to 
their mental illness,84 because it allowed only for medication that was 
medically appropriate,85 and because alternatives suggested by the 
                                                                                                                      
whether there are alternative, less intrusive means of achieving the stated objective. Id. 
(quotation omitted) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 (1987)). 
81 Id. at 228. “The procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must be 
determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case.” Id. at 
229. How much due process is required in any given situation requires consideration of 
the factors articulated in the Court’s 1976 decision in Mathews v. Eldridge: the Court must 
balance the individual’s privacy interests with the government’s interests and then assess 
whether the procedural protections in place adequately minimize the risk of erroneously 
depriving that individual of his or her liberty. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976)). 
82 Id. at 222–23, 229, 233. As a general rule, the extent of an inmate’s right under due 
process to avoid unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must always be defined in 
the context of the inmate’s confinement. Id. at 222. The Court emphasized that the individ-
ual’s liberty interest is especially significant in these circumstances since the purpose of antip-
sychotic drugs is to “alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes, in-
tended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive process.” Id. at 229. Furthermore, “[w]hile the 
therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs 
can have serious, even fatal, side effects.” Id. Conversely, the Court emphasized that the gov-
ernment’s interest is especially significant in these circumstances since “[t]here are few cases 
in which the State’s interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and 
others is greater than in the prison environment, which, ‘by definition,’ is made up of per-
sons with a ‘demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.’” Id. 
at 225 (citation omitted). 
83 Id. at 226, 233. 
84 Id. at 225–26. If an inmate’s mental illness “is the root cause of the threat he poses 
to the inmate population,” the state’s interest in safety “necessarily encompasses an interest 
in providing him with medical treatment . . . .” Id. Furthermore, the “proper use of [anti-
psychotic] drugs is one of the most effective means of treating and controlling a mental 
illness likely to cause violent behavior.” Id. at 226. 
85 Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (“[T]he fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a 
psychiatrist, and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in 
question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner’s medical interests, given the legitimate 
needs of his institutional confinement.”). 
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prisoner were not sufficient to respond effectively to the state’s con-
cerns.86 
 Although the policy itself did not specify what constituted medi-
cally appropriate medication, the Court found this criterion met by the 
requirement that the decision to medicate be made by an inmate’s 
treating physician.87 The Court reasoned that it may assume that physi-
cians, pursuant to the ethics of the medical profession, would prescribe 
a forcible regimen “only in those cases where appropriate by medical 
standards.”88 Piggybacking on this reasoning, the Court further deter-
mined that the prison policy provided adequate procedural protections 
to safeguard inmates’ significant liberty interests even though it author-
ized medical professionals, rather than judges, to decide according to 
their clinical observations whether to medicate.89 Indeed, the Court 
understood these liberty interests to be better served by allowing medi-
cal professionals such discretion because the decision to medicate is 
inherently a medical-psychiatric determination and medical diagnostics 
are not “the business of judges.”90 
B. Riggins v. Nevada and Sell v. United States: Forcible Medication  
for Trial Competence 
 Subsequently, in 1992, in Riggins v. Nevada, the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the logic of Harper to situations in which the state wished 
to render a criminal defendant competent for trial.91 The prisoner con-
tended that his right to a “full and fair trial” had been compromised by 
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs;92 the Court 
agreed, emphasizing that the inmate’s liberty interest is especially acute 
in a trial context because side effects can alter the prisoner’s outward 
appearance and the substance of his testimony, as well as his ability to 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. at 226–27 (rejecting both “court approval of treatment” and “physical restraints 
or seclusion” as adequate, less-intrusive alternative means to accomplish the state interest). 
87 Id. at 222 n.8. 
88 Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized that “[t]he provisions of the Policy [made] 
no reference to any expected benefit to the inmate’s medical condition,” and argued that 
the “Court’s reliance on the Hippocratic Oath to save the constitutionality of [the Policy 
was] unavailing.” Id. at 243, 244 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 231 (majority opinion). 
90 Id. at 231–32 (citing Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 607–09 (1979)). 
91 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
92 Id. at 133. Specifically, the inmate argued that artificial alteration of “his demeanor 
and mental state during trial” might compromise due process and that he had the right to 
show jurors his “true mental state” for his insanity defense at trial. Id. at 130. 
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follow the proceedings and communicate with counsel.93 Accordingly, 
the Court held that a state may not forcibly administer antipsychotic 
drugs to a prisoner “absent a finding of overriding justification and a 
determination of medical appropriateness.”94 According to the Court, 
the state could have satisfied due process if it had first proved the 
treatment to be medically appropriate and had then proved it to be 
either essential to prison safety or the only means by which to restore 
the prisoner’s competence for trial.95 The state, however, had allowed 
involuntary medication “without making any determination of the 
need for this course or any finding about reasonable alternatives.”96 
This utter disregard of the prisoner’s significant liberty interest ren-
dered the forcible regimen unconstitutional.97 
 In 2003, in Sell v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated 
on the conditions upon which a criminal defendant may be forcibly 
medicated to restore competence to stand trial.98 The Court held that 
the government may administer antipsychotic drugs to an unwilling 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges to render that 
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medi-
cally appropriate,99 is “substantially unlikely” to result in side effects that 
could undermine the fairness of the trial,100 and, taking account of less 
intrusive alternatives,101 is necessary significantly to further governmen-
tal trial-related interests.102 Finally, the Court noted that although the 
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. at 137. 
94 Id. at 135. 
95 Id. at 135–36 (“‘Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a 
scheme of ordered liberty and prerequisite to social justice and peace.’” (quoting Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
96 Id. at 136. 
97 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136–37. The Court elaborated that though “trial prejudice can 
sometimes be justified by an essential state interest,” the record contained no specific find-
ing that forcible medication was needed to accomplish any such interest in this particular 
case. Id. at 138. 
98 539 U.S. 166, 179–82 (2003). 
99 Id. at 181 (holding that administration of drugs is medically appropriate if “in the 
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition”). 
100 Id. (holding that administration of drugs must be “substantially likely to render the 
defendant competent to stand trial” and “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will 
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial 
defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair”). 
101 Id. (holding that a court must “find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments 
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results” and must “consider less intrusive 
means for administering the drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the con-
tempt power, before considering more intrusive methods”). 
102 Id. at 180–81 (identifying the interest in bringing a criminal defendant to trial, and 
the concomitant interest in ensuring a fair trial). 
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government’s interest in bringing a criminal defendant to trial is always 
important, the potential for lengthy future confinement of a defendant 
who refuses medication is a circumstance that may mitigate the need 
for prosecution.103 Because the appellate court had not considered 
these conditions, its decision was vacated and remanded.104 
 A crucial aspect of the Court’s holding is that a court need not even 
reach the question of whether forced medication is necessary for trial 
competence where forced medication is warranted for a separate and 
sufficient purpose, such as when an inmate is dangerous to himself or 
others, or when refusal to take drugs puts his own health at serious 
risk.105 The Court justified this determination in part by characterizing a 
decision to forcibly medicate for health or safety reasons as far more “ob-
jective and manageable” for medical experts than a decision to forcibly 
medicate to restore trial competence, as the latter decision would neces-
sarily entail balancing the “harms and benefits related to the more quin-
tessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence.”106 
IV. Rendering Death Row Inmates Competent for Execution 
Through Antipsychotic Drugs 
 It is unclear if the due process requirements of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Washington v. Harper in 1990, Riggins v. Nevada in 
1992, and Sell v. United States in 2003, can be validly applied in the con-
text of restoring competence for execution.107 It is also unclear if forci-
bly medicated condemned inmates may be executed without violating 
the Eighth Amendment principles articulated in Ford v. Wainwright.108 
                                                                                                                      
103 Id. at 180 (“The Government’s interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of 
a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the 
person or a serious crime against property. In both instances the Government seeks to 
protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.”). Par-
ticularly, the Court noted that the likely prospect of further lengthy confinement reduces 
the likelihood of the defendant’s committing future crimes. Id. 
104 Sell, 539 U.S. at 185–86. Particularly, the Court noted that the appellate court was ob-
ligated to consider how the side effects were likely to have undermined the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial, especially since the defendant had already been confined for a lengthy 
period of time and his refusal to take antipsychotic medication would likely result in future 
lengthy confinement. See id. 
105 Id. at 181–82. 
106 Id. at 182. 
107 See generally Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 
127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
108 See 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986); infra notes 109–164 and accompanying text. 
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 The Louisiana Supreme Court was one of the first courts to exam-
ine the issue in 1992 in State v. Perry.109 In Perry, the court held that the 
state could not forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to an incompe-
tent death row prisoner to carry out his death sentence while he was 
under the influence of such drugs.110 The court limited its holding to 
antipsychotic medication forcibly administered solely for purposes of 
punishment111 and resolved the case on state constitutional grounds.112 
 First, the court held that the state’s medicate-to-execute plan vio-
lated the prisoner’s state constitutional right to privacy and person-
hood.113 Absent a compelling state interest, such forced medication 
would unjustifiably intrude upon the prisoner’s “bodily integrity” by 
“chemically alter[ing] his mind and will,” and by commandeering his 
basic right to make decisions concerning his own treatment.114 A fur-
ther complication inherent in such a regime is that treatment would be 
transformed into punishment because, when medication is adminis-
tered contrary to the inmate’s best medical interests, physicians are 
forced to violate the ethical standards embodied in the Hippocratic 
oath and destroy the “trustful, communicative doctor-patient relation-
ship that is essential to psychiatric therapy.”115 The court noted that, as 
a state physician “cannot serve two masters,” there was a substantial and 
                                                                                                                      
109 See 610 So. 2d 746, 749 (La. 1992). 
110 See id. at 771. 
111 See id. at 754; Crosby, supra note 60, at 1195 (noting that the Perry decision protects 
only those inmates whom “the state admits it wants to forcibly medicate solely to allow 
their execution,” and that the state retains full authority to execute if it medicates forcibly 
“for other purposes or if the inmates voluntarily accept antipsychotic medication”). 
112 Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751. The court noted that Louisiana’s Constitution, in compari-
son to the federal constitution, was more stringent in protecting privacy interests and pro-
hibiting cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 755, 762. 
113 Id. at 755. The right of every individual to be secure in his person against “unrea-
sonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy” is embodied in Article I of the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974. La. Const. art. I, § 5. 
114 Perry, 610 So. 2d at 758. 
115 Id. at 752 (holding that, by acting “unethically and contrary to the goals of medical 
treatment,” the physician is preventing “the prisoner from receiving adequate medical treat-
ment for his mental illness”). The court proceeded to cite the Hippocratic oath, which reads: 
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Panacea, and I 
take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to keep according to my ability 
and my judgment the following Oath: . . . . I will prescribe regimen for the 
good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do 
harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give ad-
vice which may cause his death. . . . I will preserve the purity of my life and my 
art. . . . In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my pa-
tients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing . . . . 
Id. (quoting Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 647 (4th unabr. lawyer’s ed. 1976)). 
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troubling possibility that the doctor’s duty to promote the well-being of 
his patient would come second to the doctor’s duty to the state.116 
 Second, the court held that the medicate-to-execute scheme vio-
lated the state’s ban on cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment: 
The punishment is cruel because it imposes significantly more 
indignity, pain and suffering than ordinarily is necessary for 
the mere extinguishment of life, excessive because it imposes 
a severe penalty without furthering any of the valid social 
goals of punishment, and unusual because it subjects to the 
death penalty a class of offenders that has been exempt there-
from for centuries and adds novel burdens to the punishment 
of the insane which will not be suffered by sane capital of-
fenders.117 
 Similarly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held in 1993 in Singleton v. State that the state’s constitu-
tional right of privacy would be violated if the state were to forcibly 
medicate an otherwise incompetent inmate solely for purposes of pun-
ishment.118 The court determined that both federal and state due 
process allow forcible medication only if the inmate is dangerous to 
himself or to others and if the medication is in the inmate’s best medi-
cal interests.119 According to the court, a serious complication inherent 
in the process of forcibly medicating to facilitate execution flowed from 
the medical profession’s ethical standards pursuant to the Hippocratic 
Oath and the ethical codes adopted by the American Medical Associa-
tion (“AMA”) and the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”).120 Ac-
cordingly, the appropriate remedy in such a situation was for an in-
competent death row inmate to seek a stay of execution.121 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took a different 
approach in the 2003 case of Singleton v. Norris.122 It held that a state 
                                                                                                                      
116 Id. at 752. 
117 Id. The right to be free from “cruel, excessive or unusual punishment” is embodied 
in Article I of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. La. Const. art. I, § 20. 
118 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993). A South Carolina citizen’s right to privacy is found in 
Article 1 of the South Carolina Constitution. S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. 
119 Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Riggins and Harper established “the federal due process 
analysis required in a forced medication case,” and that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Perry established the correct state due process analysis, as South Carolina’s constitu-
tional privacy provision was “strikingly similar” to that of Louisiana. Id. at 60, 60–61. 
120 Id. at 61. 
121 Id. at 61–62. 
122 See 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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does not violate the Eighth Amendment when it executes a death row 
inmate who regains competence through “appropriate medical care.”123 
 The inmate in Singleton presented two arguments to support his 
petition for a stay of execution.124 First, he argued that an involuntary 
medication regimen that is valid under Harper during a stay of execu-
tion becomes invalid once an execution date is fixed, because at that 
point medication is no longer in the inmate’s best medical interest.125 
Second, he argued that antipsychotic medication can accomplish only 
“artificial competence,” meaning that while it may mask the symptoms 
of psychosis, it does not cure the underlying mental illness, for without 
medication the inmate would regress into psychosis.126 Thus, according 
to the inmate, antipsychotic medication simply is not sufficient to ren-
der a patient Ford-competent for purposes of execution.127 
 The inmate’s first argument was premised on the notion that 
medication cannot logically be in the prisoner’s best medical interest if 
a consequence of that medication would be to render the inmate com-
petent for the death penalty.128 The Eighth Circuit rejected this premise 
by concluding that focus on the inmate’s ultimate medical interests was 
inappropriate.129 It deemed medical appropriateness to have been es-
tablished by the doctor’s conclusion that medication was effective in 
controlling the inmate’s psychotic symptoms, and by the inmate’s con-
cession that he preferred medication and did not suffer serious side 
effects from it.130 Competence for execution—though an “unwanted 
consequence” of medication—was not a constitutionally significant side 
effect because the inmate’s due process interests in life and liberty were 
already “foreclosed by a lawfully imposed sentence of execution and 
the Harper procedure.”131 Consequently, a mandatory medication regi-
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. at 1027. After twenty-five years on death row, Charles Singleton was executed on 
January 6, 2004, in Arkansas. See supra note 8. 
124 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1023, 1026. 
125 Id. at 1023. 
126 Id. at 1025, 1026; id. at 1034 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 1026 (majority opinion). To be “Ford-competent,” death row inmates must be 
aware of the punishment they are about to suffer, and why they are about to suffer it. See 
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); su-
pra note 55 and accompanying text. 
128 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. The Court in Harper held that the state may medicate an inmate with serious 
mental illness against his will “if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the 
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” See 494 U.S. at 227; supra notes 77–90 and 
accompanying text. 
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men valid under Harper did not lose its constitutionality simply because 
the inmate’s execution date was set.132 
 The inmate’s second argument was premised on the notion that 
antipsychotic medication is capable only of alleviating psychotic symp-
toms, not curing the underlying mental illness.133 As the inmate relied 
on language from Perry to support his argument, the Eighth Circuit 
took care to distinguish the Perry holding.134 First, Perry had been de-
cided based on a provision in the Louisiana Constitution, which pro-
vided more expansive protections than the Eighth Amendment.135 Sec-
ond, the Perry court had accepted the view that a patient’s “best medical 
interests” must be understood in the long-term, whereas the Eighth Cir-
cuit determined that an inmate’s best medical interests ought to be de-
termined without regard to whether his execution date had been set.136 
Third, in Perry, the antipsychotic medication had been administered 
solely for purposes of punishment (“curing-to-kill”), whereas Singleton 
had been administered antipsychotic medication that was medically ap-
propriate.137 When a state forcibly medicates inmates with medically ap-
propriate antipsychotic drugs pursuant to its constitutional obligation to 
provide appropriate medical care to state prisoners, the Eighth Circuit 
judged it unnecessary to probe for any ulterior motive the state may 
have had for providing such medication.138 
 Rebutting the majority position, the dissent questioned the state’s 
intrinsic ability ever to make an objective determination of what is 
“medically appropriate” for the inmate when it possesses a concomitant 
interest in carrying out that inmate’s execution, as “[t]he State’s vigor 
in pursuing [execution] may well lead it to obscure the true reasons for 
forcibly medicating an inmate into competence.”139 Construing the 
state’s “true motivation” as impossible to discern, the dissent contended 
that the principles of Harper no longer support the forcible administra-
tion of medication once the inmate’s execution date is set.140 
                                                                                                                      
132 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026. 
133 See id. 
134 Id. at 1026–27 (citing Perry, 610 So. 2d at 757, 765–66). 
135 Id. at 1026 (citing Perry, 610 So. 2d at 765–66). 
136 Id. (citing Perry, 610 So. 2d at 766). 
137 Id. at 1026–27 (citing Perry, 610 So. 2d at 757). 
138 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1027. A state’s constitutional obligation to provide medical 
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration is identified by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). 
139 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1035 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
140 See id. at 1036. 
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 The dissent further accepted the inmate’s argument that antipsy-
chotic drugs can accomplish only “synthetic” or “artificial” sanity, and 
therefore can not render a condemned inmate Ford-competent.141 Un-
der this view, the majority erroneously equated receiving treatment with 
being cured, when in reality antipsychotic drugs are capable only of 
calming and repressing symptoms of psychosis that will ordinarily re-
turn once medication is discontinued.142 The dissent understood this 
inherent limitation to be pertinent in Singleton’s case, as the relatively 
frequent alterations in his medication regimen proved how treatment 
was incapable of consistently repressing his psychotic symptoms.143 
Thus, as is typical of most patients on antipsychotic medication, even in 
relatively stable periods Singleton was displaying only a temporary and 
unpredictable form of sanity.144 Given the fickle nature of drug-induced 
sanity, the state would likely be unable to guarantee that the inmate was 
truly Ford-competent at the precise moment of execution.145 Thus, 
Ford’s prohibition on the execution of the insane should apply to medi-
cated inmates with equal force as to unmedicated inmates, despite any 
seemingly beneficial effect provided by medication.146 
 A final concern raised by the dissent was that the physicians re-
sponsible for administering these forcible regimens would necessarily 
be compromised ethically: as the drugs’ curative powers could per-
versely become the but-for cause of execution, the doctor who pre-
scribes such drugs would assist in the inmate’s execution in direct con-
travention of the ethical standards of both the AMA and the APA.147 
                                                                                                                      
141 Id. at 1034. 
142 Id. at 1033. 
143 Id. at 1034. 
144 Id. 
145 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1034 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citation and quotation omit-
ted). 
146 Id.; see id. at 1030 (“I believe that to execute a man who is severely deranged without 
treatment, and arguably incompetent when treated, is the pinnacle of what Justice Marshall 
called the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.”) (citation and quotation omitted). The 
dissent also cited Perry to raise an alternative position—that forcing an inmate to take medi-
cation which will lead to his execution violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of exces-
sive punishments insofar as “forcibly medicated condemned inmates have to endure greater 
suffering than the typical condemned inmates.” Id. at 1034 n.8 (citing Perry, 610 So. 2d at 
766–68); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
147 See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1036 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Both organizations prohibit 
members from assisting in the execution of a condemned prisoner. See Council on Ethical 
& Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with 
Annotations E-2.06 (2010–2011), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/up- 
load/mm/369/e206capitalpunish.pdf; The Death Penalty in the United States, Am. Psychologi-
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The dissent concluded that doctors treating psychotic condemned 
prisoners will be put in the impossible position of either treating the 
prisoner—-knowing such treatment may be the proximate cause of his 
execution—-or leaving the prisoner untreated and condemned to an 
insanity “filled with disturbing delusions and hallucinations.”148 Accord-
ing to the dissent, this ethical dilemma posed not only a policy issue but 
a legal issue, since the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
the significance of the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the 
medical profession.149 Given this concern along with all the others, the 
dissent concluded that the appropriate remedy in these situations is for 
the district court to enter a permanent stay of execution.150 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit echoed the Singleton 
dissent’s position in 2009 in Thompson v. Bell.151 The court considered an 
inmate’s claim that his execution would be unconstitutional when he 
had been rendered “competent” through forced administration of an-
tipsychotic medication.152 Although the court did not definitively answer 
this constitutional question because it found that the inmate had not 
been forced to take antipsychotic drugs,153 it nonetheless provided its 
views on the question in dicta.154 It reasoned that the due process hold-
ings in Harper, Riggins, and Sell supported the “logical inference” that, 
unless “absolutely necessary or medically appropriate,” a state that sub-
jects a prisoner to involuntary medication acts contrary to the Eighth 
                                                                                                                      
cal Ass’n (August 2001), http://www.apa.org/about/governance/council/policy/death-
penalty.aspx. 
148 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1037 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. at 1037 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)). In Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the State of Washington’s ban on as-
sisted suicide was rationally related to legitimate government interests. 521 U.S. at 728. 
One of those interests included the state’s “interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of 
the medical profession.” Id. at 731. The Court noted the fact that “the American Medical 
Association, like many other medical and physicians’ groups, ha[d] concluded that physi-
cian-assisted suicide [was] fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.” 
Id. (quotation omitted). The Court also noted that physician-assisted suicide could “un-
dermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-
honored line between healing and harming.” Id. 
150 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1037 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
151 See Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 439–41 (6th Cir. 2009). 
152 Id. at 437. 
153 Id. at 441 & n.3 (expressing agreement with the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Single-
ton, 319 F.3d at 1027, that a “chemical competency claim arises only when the defendant is 
subject to a forced medication order and execution is imminent,” and deciding to “leave 
the question of whether executing the ‘chemically competent’ constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment for another day”). 
154 Id. at 439–41. 
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Amendment’s evolving standards of decency.155 Drawing on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Sell, the Sixth Circuit noted it might be un-
constitutional to medicate a condemned prisoner “already destined for 
a lengthy confinement just to render the prisoner competent for legal 
proceedings.”156 The Sixth Circuit continued to note that executing the 
“chemically competent” could be just as cruel as executing the insane if 
antipsychotic drugs were insufficient to enable an understanding of the 
reason for the punishment.157 In such a situation, the chemically com-
petent prisoner, similar to an insane prisoner, would be robbed of the 
opportunity to prepare both mentally and spiritually for death.158 
 Dissenting on this issue, Judge Richard F. Suhrheinrich argued 
that the majority’s view was inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.159 Instead, rendering an inmate competent for execution is 
simply a constitutional sum of its constitutional parts, given that the 
state is constitutionally obligated “to attend to a prisoner’s serious 
medical needs,”160 that the state may “involuntarily medicat[e] a pris-
oner if he is a danger to himself or others,”161 that the state is permitted 
“to medicate a defendant to render him competent to stand trial,”162 
and that the state may execute a death sentence if the “prisoner is 
competent on the eve of his execution.”163 Understanding Supreme 
Court precedent in this manner, the dissent concluded that it is only 
logical that an involuntarily chemically competent prisoner may be exe-
cuted.164 
                                                                                                                      
155 Id. at 440. 
156 Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 180). 
157 Thompson, 580 F.3d at 440. 
158 Id. (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 419–20 (Powell, J., concurring)) (“If forced medication 
reduces a prisoner’s delusions and controls his outward behavior, but does not improve his 
understanding of his impending death or his ability to prepare for it, it is quite possible 
that the prisoner cannot be executed under the principles of Ford.”). The Sixth Circuit 
also expressed a concern that antipsychotic medication may only appear to make an oth-
erwise incompetent prisoner competent. See id. at 440. The court quickly proceeded to 
qualify this statement, however, by adding that it was not stating that that “the execution of 
those rendered chemically competent ‘likely’ violates the Eighth Amendment,” only that 
“it is possible, under some circumstances, that such an act would amount to a constitutional 
violation for the reasons discussed.” Id. at 441 n.2. 
159 Id. at 445 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
160 Id. at 448 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). 
161 Id. (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 223). 
162 Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81). 
163 Thompson, 580 F.3d at 448 (internal citation omitted) (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 422). 
164 Id. (“[I]f all of the predicate acts of carrying out a valid death sentence on a men-
tally ill inmate are either constitutionally required or permitted, and the death penalty 
itself is constitutional, the state’s imposition of the death penalty to an inmate rendered 
competent via involuntary medication must also be constitutional.”). 
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V. Constitutional Ramifications of Forcibly Medicating to 
Facilitate Execution 
A. Chemical Competence and Ford-Competence Are Not Mutually Exclusive 
 Some scholars argue that the Eighth Amendment mandates a 
categorical exemption from the death penalty for forcibly medicated 
death row inmates on the understanding that antipsychotic drugs are 
capable of calming and repressing symptoms of psychosis, but not of 
curing the underlying mental illness.165 Considering such “artificial” or 
“synthetic” competence to fall below the standard articulated in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright and its 2007 
decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, these scholars view execution of the 
forcibly medicated as intrinsically cruel and unusual, and argue that if 
there has once been a determination of incompetence, then there 
should be a permanent stay of execution.166 This position, however, is 
legally problematic because it is simultaneously too prescriptive and 
based on a variable premise.167 
 The prohibition against execution of the insane described in Ford 
and Panetti does not require full-blown normalcy or rationality as under-
stood by laypeople or the medical community.168 Rather, it requires that 
the prisoner, on the eve of his execution, know of the fact of his pend-
ing execution and possess a rational understanding of why he is about to 
be executed.169 Given even the current status of antipsychotic medica-
tion, it appears too prescriptive to suppose that no inmate could ever 
meet this standard through use of antipsychotic drugs and psychother-
                                                                                                                      
165 See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 58, at 649 (noting that antipsychotic medication ame-
liorates symptoms by providing relief from delusions and hallucinations, but that medica-
tion is not a cure for the underlying illness and a patient’s symptoms will return once 
medication is discontinued); see also Byers, supra note 4, at 377 (noting consensus in medi-
cal community that antipsychotic drugs “provide only temporary relief”); Sarah F. DePan-
filis, Singleton v. Norris: Exploring the Insanity of Forcibly Medicating, Then Eliminating, the 
Insane, 4 Conn. Pub. Int. L. J. 68, 75 (2004) (noting the same); Jenkins, supra note 60, at 
169 (noting the same). 
166 See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 58, at 642 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s exemption 
of the insane from the death penalty [should] include persons whose sanity can only be 
restored through medication.”); Jennifer E. Lloyd, Primum non nocere: Singleton v. Norris 
and the Ethical Dilemma of Medicating the Condemned, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 225, 249 (2005) (agree-
ing with the Louisiana and South Carolina supreme courts that commutation in appropri-
ate cases is the best approach). See generally Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); 
Ford v. Wainright, 447 U.S. 399 (1986). 
167 See infra notes 168–186 and accompanying text. 
168 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959–60; Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
169 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959; Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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apy.170 Indeed, antipsychotic medication has been deemed capable of 
rendering an otherwise insane inmate competent to stand trial—a stan-
dard requiring that criminal defendants possess the capacity to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings against them, to consult with coun-
sel, and to assist in preparing their defense.171 Such competence appears 
to be based on more rigorous cognitive standards than does compe-
tence for execution.172 Furthermore, antipsychotic medication is proven 
to have widely different curative effects on different individuals.173 
 At the same time, it is legally suspect to decide a point of constitu-
tional law purely on the present-day effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
antipsychotic medications, a foundation that we can confidently assume 
is evolving, along with all of modern science.174 Considering the drastic 
improvement in antipsychotic medication since its inception over fifty-
                                                                                                                      
170 See Motion for Leave to File Brief & Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass’n & 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
13–14, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), (No. 02–5664), 2003 WL 176630 (“Antip-
sychotic medications are not only an accepted but often essential, irreplaceable treatment 
for psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for schizophrenia, because the benefits of 
antipsychotic medications for patients with psychoses, compared to any other available 
means of treatment, are so palpably great compared with their generally manageable side 
effects.”). 
171 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
172 Compare Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (competence to stand trial), with Panetti, 551 U.S. at 
959–60 (competence to be executed), and Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(competence to be executed). 
173 Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, supra note 15, at 1. The National Institute of Men-
tal Health offers a simplified summary of the varying effects antipsychotic medication can 
have on different individuals: 
Medications treat the symptoms of mental disorders. They cannot cure the 
disorder, but they make people feel better so they can function. Medications 
work differently for different people. Some people get great results from 
medications and only need them for a short time. For example, a person with 
depression may feel much better after taking a medication for a few months, 
and may never need it again. People with disorders like schizophrenia or bi-
polar disorder, or people who have long-term or severe depression or anxiety 
may need to take medication for a much longer time. Some people get side 
effects from medications and other people don’t. Doses can be small or large, 
depending on the medication and the person. 
Id. Additionally, various factors can affect how these medications work in different pa-
tients, including the patient’s: mental disorder; age, sex, and body size; physical illnesses; 
habits (like smoking and drinking); liver and kidney function; genetics; other medications 
and herbal/vitamin supplements; diet; and if medications are taken as prescribed. Id. 
174 See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance of 
Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1033, 
1062–65 (2002) (discussing the history and evolution of antipsychotic drugs from 1955 to 
the present). 
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five years ago, it is more likely than not that the curative effects of an-
tipsychotic medication will continue to be developed and improved.175 
 Nor is a categorically permanent stay of execution based upon the 
perceived shortcomings of antipsychotic medication supported by U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent.176 The Court has indeed articulated only a 
baseline standard regarding when someone is sufficiently competent 
under the Eighth Amendment.177 Justice Powell’s judgment in Ford— 
that states should have “substantial leeway” to adjudicate claims of in-
competence—-remains in force.178 
 It is true that the insane are one of only three categories of defen-
dants currently exempted from the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment, along with defendants under eighteen years of age at the 
time the crime was committed and mentally retarded defendants.179 
Nonetheless, insanity is distinguishable from youth or retardation, 
which are unvarying conditions: a defendant either was or was not 
                                                                                                                      
175 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The state of our knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is 
evolving and may one day produce effective drugs that have only minimal side effects.”). 
The legal implications of this evolution must also evolve: 
The arrival of novel agents . . . has allowed patients to receive antipsychotic 
medication with fewer side effects, a lower risk of neurological damage, and 
possibly better outcomes than the older drugs permitted. Thus, most patients 
who take antipsychotic drugs need no longer endure chemical straitjacketing to 
get relief from their delusions, hallucinations, and disordered thinking. Judges, 
legal scholars, and lawyers who deal with persons who take antipsychotic drugs 
now should experience an analogous process, one that unbuckles the conceptual 
straitjacket that frequently has prevented recognition of the need for and value 
of antipsychotic medications. Courts and legal scholars must evaluate antipsy-
chotic drugs without being misled by distorted and increasingly outdated views 
found in existing case law and secondary legal sources. 
Mossman, supra note 174, at 1043 (citation omitted). 
176 See infra notes 177–185 and accompanying text. 
177 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959; Ford, 447 U.S. at 422. 
178 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring). Though the Court has created a 
categorical exemption for the insane and mentally retarded, it has recognized that not all 
individuals who claim insanity or mental retardation will be so impaired as to fall within 
the category of defendants society is prepared to exempt from the death penalty. See Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002); Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. Thus, in both circumstances, 
it opted to allow the states to develop appropriate procedures to enforce the constitutional 
safeguard. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. By contrast, while recogniz-
ing that not all minors will possess the sort of immaturity that diminishes criminal culpabil-
ity, the Court was willing to draw a categorical, admittedly arbitrary, line at eighteen years 
of age because it is “the point where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
179 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71 (exempting those under eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
321 (exempting mentally retarded); Ford, 477 U.S. at 409–10 (exempting insane). 
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eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed; a defendant 
either meets the quantitative definition of mental retardation or does 
not.180 By contrast, incompetence is a clinically treatable condition.181 
An individual who was unquestionably competent at the time he or she 
committed the capital offense but who subsequently became incompe-
tent while on death row often can, with treatment, cycle back out of 
incompetence again.182 
 This fact adds yet another layer of variability to the question of 
competence for execution, and joins with those previously cited to in-
dicate that the level of competence achievable via antipsychotic drugs is 
not an appropriate basis for exemption; instead, upon this basis, com-
petence would be better settled by a flexible approach allowing for in-
dividualized determinations than by an indiscriminate constitutional 
ban.183 So long as states afford sufficient procedural processes to ensure 
that a condemned inmate possesses—and will continue to possess up to 
the eve of execution—the level of understanding required by Ford, an 
inmate who is merely “doped up” or has an especially turbulent history 
of reaction to antipsychotic drugs should not be deemed Ford-compe-
tent.184 An inmate who is particularly lucid and stable, on the other 
hand, may meet the constitutional standard.185 
 In sum, a categorical Eighth Amendment ban against executing 
inmates involuntarily subjected to antipsychotic medication should not 
be grounded in the premise that current antipsychotic drugs cannot 
                                                                                                                      
180 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22. One cannot alter 
the age at which a crime was committed, and mental retardation is defined as “significantly 
sub-average general intellectual functioning” that manifests before the age of eighteen. See 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. Mental retardation is usually defined 
in part by one’s quantitative intellegence quotient score. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09 
nn.3–5. 
181 See Mossman, supra note 174, at 1153. Cf. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolv-
ing Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785, 
788–89 (2009) (“Certain mental illnesses bear some striking similarities to both mental 
retardation and juvenile status. Severe mental illness at the time of the offense may signifi-
cantly diminish the offender’s blameworthiness and amenability to deterrence in ways not 
unlike mental retardation and juvenile status.” (emphasis added)). 
182 See Mossman, supra note 174, at 1153. 
183 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating the need for indi-
vidualized determination of culpability since differences in maturity between seventeen-
year-olds and young adults are not proven to be so universal and significant as “to justify a 
bright-line prophylactic rule against capital punishment of the former”). 
184 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17. 
185 See id. 
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achieve genuine competence in accordance with the principles of Ford 
and Panetti.186 
B. Facilitating Execution via Forced Administration of Antipsychotic  
Drugs Constitutes Punishment That Violates the Eighth and  
Fourteenth Amendments 
 A more persuasive argument for exempting the chemically compe-
tent from the death penalty will focus not on the level of competence 
achievable through antipsychotic drugs, but on the nature of the pun-
ishment the state in fact exacts by forcibly medicating and then execut-
ing an otherwise incompetent inmate.187 In contrast to inmates who 
retain sanity while on death row, those who become incompetent must 
endure many more intrusions on their liberty and dignity in the proc-
ess of being put to death by the state.188 These necessary and added 
elements to the punishment of death beg the question whether the 
state is still engaged in the “mere extinguishment of life,”189 or if, in-
stead, it is unduly infringing upon inmates’ constitutional rights in its 
“insistence on its pound of flesh.”190 Does forcible medication to achieve 
competence amount to cruel and unusual punishment?191 Is it indeed 
necessary to further the varied government interests involved in exact-
ing punishment for crimes?192 
 Because the 2003 decision Sell v. United States represents the culmi-
nation to date of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings regarding forcible 
medication of prison inmates, states should apply that partial precedent 
and adhere to its basic requirements when seeking to forcibly restore 
competence for execution.193 Upon closer examination, however, it be-
                                                                                                                      
186 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959–60; Ford, 447 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring); see also 
Steven K. Erickson et al., Legal Fallacies of Antipsychotic Drugs. 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & 
L. 235, 241 (2007). 
187 See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 768 (La. 1992); Jenkins, supra note 60, at 177; 
Lloyd, supra note 166, at 243–44. 
188 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768. 
189 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see also supra notes 31–46 and accom-
panying text. 
190 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (quotation omitted) (concluding that unless the Court detects a violation of 
principles of justice “[r]ooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,” it is obli-
gated to refrain from interfering with State executions, “no matter how strong one’s per-
sonal feeling of revulsion against a State’s insistence on its pound of flesh.”). 
191 See infra notes 201–264 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra notes 253–264 and accompanying text. 
193 See 539 U.S. at 177–82. Not only is this the most recent Supreme Court opinion on 
the issue of forcible medication of inmates, but the Court also specifically summarizes and 
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comes clear that for two reasons the requirements established in Sell 
cannot logically be met in this latter scenario.194 First, Sell requires that 
treatment be “medically appropriate,” but in cases of execution, medi-
cal appropriateness is impossible to achieve: as soon as an inmate is 
scheduled for execution, forcible medication by definition ceases to be 
an ethical form of treatment and simply becomes a component of capi-
tal punishment to be inflicted by the state.195 Second, in contrast to the 
government interest in bringing a defendant to trial stressed by the 
Court in Sell, the government interest in execution is intrinsically 
weaker than a combination of the inmate’s privacy interest196 and the 
state’s own interest in preserving the integrity of the medical commu-
nity.197 Substituting life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
execution is precisely the sort of lengthy future confinement the Court 
in Sell reasoned can mitigate the need for prosecution.198 
 The inapplicability of the Sell due process requirements to cases of 
execution renders the state’s punishment inherently excessive, in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.199 Subverting the curative mission of 
the medical profession to facilitate execution transforms medication 
from a source of healing into a source of punishment that inflicts acute 
psychological distress and suffering; at the same time, the lack of a suf-
ficiently important government interest renders this punishment un-
necessary.200 
                                                                                                                      
synthesizes the holdings of its 1990 decision inWashington v. Harper and its 1992 decision in 
Riggins v. Nevada into the standards it ultimately articulates. See id. at 177–79. 
194 See id. at 177–82; see also infra notes 195–198 and accompanying text. 
195 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; Perry, 610 So.2d at 753 (internal citation and quotation 
omitted) (“When a medical procedure is done at the request of the patient and for his 
benefit, it is a treatment. When the identical medical procedure is done against a person’s 
interest or will, it is either a battery, if lacking legal sanction, or a punishment, if imposed 
by legal authority.”). For an interesting discussion of the difference between therapy and 
punishment, see Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework 
for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 815–18 (1982). 
196 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 229–
30). 
197 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (identifying the state’s “in-
terest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” and discussing the 
manner in which authorized physician-assisted suicide could undermine the trust essential 
to the doctor-patient relationship “by blurring the time-honored line between healing and 
harming”). 
198 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
199 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
200 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958). 
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1. Medical Appropriateness 
 In the 2003 decision Singleton v. Norris, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that a “mandatory medication regime, valid under the pend-
ency of a stay of execution, does not become unconstitutional under 
the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision Washington v. Harper when an 
execution date is set.”201 This holding essentially proposes that the 
medical appropriateness of an inmate’s treatment program is a con-
stant—that it can be determined on the basis of the patient’s medical 
condition alone, in a vacuum, without consideration of any outside cir-
cumstances.202 Although on the surface the holding appears to be con-
sistent with the Court’s language in Sell that medically appropriate 
treatment means treatment that is in the “patient’s best medical inter-
ests in light of his medical condition,”203 setting the execution date does 
invariably result in significant alterations to the punishment inflicted by 
the state that cannot be dismissed as legally irrelevant.204 First, the 
forcible medication program will no longer accord with the ethical 
standards of the medical profession.205 Second, the forcible medication 
program, turned to use as a means by which the state may inflict capital 
punishment, has the perverse effect of inflicting acute psychological 
strain upon the condemned inmate.206 As a result of these alterations, a 
forcible medication regimen automatically loses its medical appropri-
ateness, and a state that persists in enforcing such a regimen to facili-
tate execution does so in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.207 
                                                                                                                      
201 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026. 
202 See id. 
203 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added); see Amir Vonsover, No Reason for Exemption: 
Singleton v. Norris and Involuntary Medication of Mentally Ill Capital Murderers for the Purpose 
of Execution, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 311, 339 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he phrase ‘medical 
condition,’ by its plain language, does not take into account effects on competency to be 
executed (or to stand trial),” but refers only to an inmate’s “diagnosable mental illnesses” 
and whether medication is appropriate to treat those mental illnesses). 
204 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768; Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 147, at E-2.06; see also infra 
notes 205–252 and accompanying text. 
205 See Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 147, at E-2.06 (“When a condemned prisoner has 
been declared incompetent to be executed, physicians should not treat the prisoner for 
the purpose of restoring competence unless a commutation order is issued before treat-
ment begins.”). 
206 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768. 
207 See id.; Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 147, at E-2.06; see also infra notes 208–252 and 
accompanying text. 
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a. An Unethical Forcible Medication Regimen Is Not Medically Appropriate 
Under Sell, Riggins, and Harper 
 Constitutional doctrine relevant to the issue of forcibly medicating 
condemned inmates to restore competence, including the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against execution of the insane and the due 
process requirement that a forcible medication regimen be medically 
appropriate, has made it impossible for states to accomplish execution 
of incompetent death row inmates without direct participation from 
physicians, the only experts capable of assessing, diagnosing, and treat-
ing the psychosis of these inmates.208 Physicians, however, are bound by 
the Hippocratic oath, and the medical community is all but unanimous 
in the view that it is professionally unethical to participate in execution 
procedures.209 The tension between constitutional principles and 
medical ethics also surfaces in the administration of lethal injection, a 
complex procedure that can be botched without the participation of 
                                                                                                                      
208 See Nancy S. Horton, Comment, Restoration of Competency for Execution: Furiosus Solo 
Furore Punitur, 44 Sw. L.J. 1191, 1212–13 (1990) (explaining that a psychiatrist, who must 
evaluate, diagnose, medically treat, and report to judicial factfinder when inmate has re-
gained competency has, in effect, “actively sign[ed] the defendant’s death warrant by initi-
ating the execution procedure”). 
209 See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (27th ed. 2000); see also Am. Med. Ass’n, supra 
note 147, at E-2.06 (“A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life 
when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execu-
tion.”); Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual (5th ed. 2005), available at http://www. 
acponline.org/running_practice/ethics/manual/ethicman5th.htm#govt (“Participation by 
physicians in the execution of prisoners except to certify death is unethical.”); Nurses’ Role in 
Capital Punishment, Am. Nurses Ass’n ( Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nursingworld.org/ 
MainMenuCategories/HealthcareandPolicyIssues/ANAPositionStatements/EthicsandHu- 
manRights.aspx (“Participation in executions, either directly or indirectly, is viewed as con-
trary to the fundamental goals and ethical traditions of the nursing profession.”); Policy 
Statement Policy No. 200125, Participation of Health Professionals in Capital Punishment, Am. Pub. 
Health Ass’n ( Jan. 1, 2001), http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch/de- 
fault.htm?id=264 (“Health professional participation in executions or pre-execution proce-
dures is a serious violation of ethical codes and should be grounds for active disciplinary 
proceedings including expulsion from society membership and license revocation.”); State-
ment on Physician Nonparticipation in Legally Authorized Executions, Am. Soc’y of Anesthesi-
ologists (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.asahq.org/publicationsAndServices/standards/41.pdf 
(“Although lethal injection mimics certain technical aspects of the practice of anesthesia, 
capital punishment in any form is not the practice of medicine[;] [b]ecause of ancient and 
modern principles of medical ethics, legal execution should not necessitate participation by 
an anesthesiologist or any other physician.”); World Med. Ass’n Gen. Assembly, Resolution on 
Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, World Med. Ass’n (Oct. 2008), http://www. 
wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c1/index.html (“[I]t is unethical for physicians to 
participate in capital punishment, in any way, or during any step of the execution process, 
including its planning and the instruction and/or training of persons to perform execu-
tions.”). 
1312 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1279 
medical professionals.210 In a medicating-to-execute context, the ten-
sion is exacerbated because diagnosis, medication, and treatment can-
not be accomplished by trained technicians, but require the expertise 
and professional judgment of medical doctors.211 Additionally, when 
“treatment” is distorted into punishment, the patient-doctor relation-
ship is perverted and trust shattered.212 Lastly, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the very requirement that treatment be medically appropri-
ate depends upon medical expertise and professional ethics.213 If the 
consensus in the medical community is that forcible medication regi-
mens are no longer medically appropriate once an execution date has 
been set, the legal community is obligated to defer to this professional 
judgment.214 
                                                                                                                      
210 See Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., Breach of Trust: Physician Participation in 
Executions in the United States 3 (1994) (noting that lawmakers and corrections offi-
cials attempting to create the “appearance of humane, sterile or painless executions . . . look 
to physicians to apply their medical skills for this purpose” in contravention of physicians’ 
commitment to work for the benefit of their patients); Ty Alper, The Role of State Medical 
Boards in Regulating Physician Participation in Executions, 95 J. Med. Licensure & Discipline 1, 
1 (2009) (noting that “legal challenges to states’ lethal injection practices” as well as recent 
incidents of botched executions “have contributed to an increased call for the involvement in 
executions of trained medical professionals, namely physicians”); Kenneth Baum, “To Comfort 
Always”: Physician Participation in Executions, 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 47, 50 (2001) 
(noting that as capital punishment becomes increasingly medicalized, the tension escalates 
between medical practice acts that allow physicians to be subjected to professional discipline 
for participation in execution and most death penalty statutes, which mainly “provide for or 
even require physician participation in executions”). 
211 See Jenkins, supra note 60, at 172. Dissimilar to medical professionals who partici-
pate in lethal injection, psychiatrists treating incompetent death row inmates must be far 
more proactive and interactive, which more fully implicates the ethics of the medical pro-
fession and the nature of the doctor-patient relationship: 
The role of the psychiatrist involves evaluating competency for execution, pre-
scribing and administering psychoactive drugs to render one sane for execu-
tion, and overseeing a condemned prisoner’s progress on such medication to 
ascertain when the inmate is “competent” for execution. When other medical 
doctors take part in capital punishment proceedings the inmate is usually com-
petent and his approaching death is usually a foregone conclusion. The doc-
tor’s services are only needed to manage the medical aspects of the execution. 
The competency determination, however, employs the psychiatrist’s services in 
a manner involving a high degree of professional discretion and judgment and 
ultimately means life or death for the inmate. Thus, the psychiatrist is an active 
participant in the process. 
Id. 
212 See Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 41; Daniel N. Lerman, Note, 
Second Opinion: Inconsistent Deference to Medical Ethics in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 95 Geo. 
L.J. 1941, 1976 (2007). 
213 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 & n.8. 
214 See Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 44. 
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 In Singleton, the Eighth Circuit decided that it did not need to un-
dertake a “difficult and unnecessary inquiry” into the state’s motives for 
forcibly medicating, given that the state has the obligation to provide 
appropriate medical care.215 On the one hand, this rationale appears to 
be consistent with the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Sell that if a court 
authorizes forcible medication on the grounds discussed in Harper— 
namely, to manage inmate dangerousness or to ensure that the inmate 
ingest drugs crucial to his health— “the need to consider authorization 
on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.”216 On the other 
hand, this rationale blatantly ignores the further fact that, in Harper, 
consideration of the ethical standards of the medical community was 
specifically incorporated by the Court into the analysis of what is medi-
cally appropriate for the inmate.217 The Harper Court determined the 
criterion of medical appropriateness to be met by the requirement that 
the decision to medicate be made by an inmate’s treating physician.218 
The Court operated on the assumption that physicians would act in the 
best interests of their patients and dismissed concerns that medication 
would be prescribed for reasons unrelated to medical needs on the 
grounds that “the ethics of the medical profession are to the con-
trary.”219 The Court therefore relied on the ethical standards of the 
medical profession to ensure inmates’ constitutional right to medically 
appropriate care.220 This reliance in turn necessitates consideration of 
medical ethical standards in deciding related cases.221 
 The decision to forcibly medicate involves diagnosing an inmate 
with a mental disorder, determining whether, as a result of that disor-
der, he is dangerous to himself or others, and determining what regi-
men of psychoanalysis and/or pharmaceutical intervention will best 
serve to improve his cognition and behavior.222 Those responsible for 
the inmate’s well-being must weigh the benefits of improved behavior 
against the impact of unwanted intervention and potentially devastat-
ing side effects.223 Moreover, the inmate’s reaction to medication must 
                                                                                                                      
215 319 F.3d at 1027. 
216 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. 
217 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 & n.8. 
218 Id. at 222 n.8. 
219 Id. 
220 See id.; see also Lloyd, supra note 166, at 236. 
221 See Lloyd, supra note 166, at 236. 
222 See Horton, supra note 208, at 1212–13. 
223 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. To conclude that involuntary medication will significantly 
further state interests in bringing a criminal defendant to trial, a court must find that ad-
ministration of the drugs is “substantially likely to render the defendant competent to 
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be continually monitored, and treatment mechanisms adjusted to op-
timize mental health and long-term normative adjustment.224 
 Clearly, although the decision to forcibly medicate entails “societal 
and legal implications,” it is essentially and inescapably a medical deter-
mination that can be made only by medical professionals.225 Indeed, in 
Sell, Harper, and the 1992 decision of Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme 
Court has clearly emphasized that a court’s ultimate decision regarding 
the medical appropriateness of a forcible medication regimen will 
hinge on preliminary determinations of medical experts.226 
                                                                                                                      
stand trial,” and, at the same time, is “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will 
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial 
defense.” Id. By analogy, in the context of execution, involuntary medication would have 
to be determined to be substantially likely to render the condemned competent for execu-
tion, and substantially unlikely to result in serious side effects that would interfere signifi-
cantly his ability to rationally understand his pending execution. See id. 
224 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231–32; see also Gardner, supra note 195, at 816 (distinguish-
ing coercive therapy from punishment in part by noting that therapy is “purposeful behav-
ior toward another person . . . intended to alter that person’s condition in a manner bene-
ficial to him,” and adding that “[t]his purportedly beneficial behavior is always subject to 
revision upon a showing that a different mode of behavior would produce more beneficial 
results, or that a change in the person’s condition has [eliminated] the need for further 
therapy”). 
225 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231–32. In its discussion regarding whether due process de-
manded judicial determinations of competency to stand trial, the Harper Court concluded 
that competency determinations could constitutionally be made by qualified medical pro-
fessionals: “Though it cannot be doubted that the decision to medicate has societal and 
legal implications, the Constitution does not prohibit the State from permitting medical 
personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms.” Id. The Court elabo-
rated on its own institutional shortcomings in formulating competency determinations: 
“We cannot make the facile assumption that the patient’s intentions, or a substituted 
judgment approximating those intentions, can be determined in a single judicial hearing 
apart from the realities of frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical profes-
sionals.” Id. Finally, the Court conceded that determinations regarding competency are 
fundamentally medical decisions to be made by medical professionals: 
Under [the prison policy], the decisionmaker is asked to review a medical 
treatment decision made by a medical professional. That review requires two 
medical inquiries: first, whether the inmate suffers from a “mental disorder”; 
and second, whether, as a result of that disorder, he is dangerous to himself, 
others, or their property. Under the Policy, the hearing committee reviews on 
a regular basis the staff’s choice of both the type and dosage of drugs to be 
administered, and can order appropriate changes. The risks associated with 
antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medi-
cal professionals. 
Id. at 232–33 (citation omitted). 
226 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–83 (holding that opinions of medical experts provide the 
basis for courts’ determinations of medical appropriateness); Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135–37 
(holding the same); Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 & n.8, 231–33 (holding the same). 
2010] Forcible Medication of Condemned Inmates and the Constitution 1315 
 But the medical community is all but unanimous in the view that 
treatment to restore competence for execution is ethically proscribed 
behavior for medical professionals, members of a profession dedicated 
to healing, who pledge to “first, do no harm.”227 Medical ethics may not 
always warrant judicial deference, but deference is surely mandated if 
the practice at issue can only be performed by medical professionals 
but is ethically proscribed by the medical community,228 and especially 
if the Supreme Court relies upon medical participation, expertise, and 
discretion to ensure the constitutionality of the practice.229 
 Thus, it is imperative that courts consider the pertinent ethical 
guidelines of the AMA and the APA when deciding the medical appro-
priateness of forcibly medicating to restore competence for execu-
tion.230 These guidelines prohibit physicians from participating in legally 
authorized executions.231 The principle underlying this prohibition is 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 37. This report describes the 
outraged response from the medical community to statutes requiring physician participa-
tion in executions. Id. at 13–16. Furthermore, this report details the manner in which par-
ticipation in executions is antithetical to the purpose of the medical profession: “When the 
healing hand becomes the hand inflicting the wound, the world is turned inside out.” Id. 
at 36–39 (quotation omitted). 
228 Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (citing lack of medical consensus regard-
ing the question of when life begins as a reason for the judiciary to refrain from “specu-
lat[ing] as to the answer”). 
229 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 & n.8; see also Lerman, supra note 212, at 1977 (noting 
that ethical guidelines regarding practices such as advertising, retaining patients’ medical 
records, and charging hospital admission fees do not warrant judicial deference in the 
manner that “physician involvement in capital proceedings” do, since the latter practice 
uniquely implicates “professional integrity, decency, dignity and liberty”). 
230 See Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 147, at E–2.06; Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra 
note 147; see also Lloyd, supra note 166, at 233–35 (illustrating the manner in which “the 
law and medical ethics are inextricably linked” by citing examples of cases in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court has relied on medical ethics). Indeed, history is rife with examples of 
disastrous consequences when state law compromises a physician’s loyalty to the medical 
needs of his or her patient. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 166, at 246–47 (discussing the man-
ner in which physicians contributed to state policy of “racial hygiene” in Nazi Germany); 
Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 29 (citing World Med. Ass’n, Hand-
book of Declarations 22 (1985)) (recounting how, following the “egregious violations of 
medical ethics perpetrated by physicians during the Nazi regime,” the World Medical As-
sociation adopted the Declaration of Geneva (1948) and the International Code of Medi-
cal Ethics (1949) intended to reinvigorate the spirit of the Hippocratic oath and “con-
demn physician complicity in the commission of antihumanitarian acts at the behest of the 
state”). 
231 See Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 147, at E–2.06 (defining physician participation as: 
“(1) an action which would directly cause the death of the condemned; (2) an action 
which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to directly 
cause the death of the condemned; (3) an action which could automatically cause an exe-
cution to be carried out on a condemned prisoner”). 
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that a physician is “a member of a profession dedicated to preserving 
life when there is hope of doing so.”232 Physicians are not ethically en-
joined from palliative measures intended to mitigate extreme suffering 
resulting from psychosis or illness; in cases in which a condemned pris-
oner has been declared incompetent to be executed, however, physi-
cians may not treat that prisoner to restore competence, unless a com-
mutation order has been issued before treatment begins.233 How, then, 
if treatment to restore competence for execution is specifically prohib-
ited by the medical community, can it in any sense be deemed “medi-
cally appropriate” as required by Sell? 234 Does it not lose its former 
medical appropriateness and become simply a step in the enforcement 
of a legal punishment?235 
 These questions are answered by the American Bar Association, 
which asserts that unethical medical treatment cannot be understood 
to be medically appropriate and so cannot meet the threshold for con-
stitutionality required by Sell and Harper.236 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court advocated a similar position in its 1992 decision State v. Perry, 
concluding that forcible medication to restore competence for execu-
tion is “antithetical to the basic principles of the healing arts” and can-
not constitute medical treatment.237 Rather, as a necessary precursor to 
execution, forcible medication must be understood as part of the capi-
                                                                                                                      
232 Id. 
233 Id.; see Lloyd, supra note 166, at 232 (“Because the ethical permissibility of the 
treatment turns on the physician’s intention for administering the medication, the AMA is 
relying on the inherent high ethical standards that physicians are perceived to embody.”). 
234 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text. 
235 See infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text. 
236 See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 676 (noting the consensus among medical 
health professionals that treatment with the purpose or likely effect of enabling the state to 
carry out the execution of an incompetent inmate is unethical, and concluding that 
“[b]ecause treatment is unethical, it is not ‘medically appropriate’ and is therefore consti-
tutionally impermissible when a prisoner objects under the criteria enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in [Sell] and [Harper]”). 
237 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751, 753 (noting that when a medical procedure is against 
the patient’s interest and will but is legally authorized, it constitutes government-imposed 
punishment); Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 37 (“[I]n the larger pic-
ture, the physician is taking over some of the responsibility for carrying out the punish-
ment and in this context, becomes the handmaiden of the state as executioner. In return 
for possible reduction of pain, the physician, in effect, acts under the control of the state, 
doing harm.”); Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the 
Law and Beyond, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1243, 1272–78 (1990) (discussing the blurry legal distinc-
tion between medical treatment and criminal punishment, and arguing that involuntary 
administration of psychotropic medication should be understood as punishment). 
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tal punishment itself.238 The analysis of the Eighth Circuit in Singleton is 
therefore irretrievably defective for declining to examine the state’s 
motives for forcibly medicating and in ignoring the contingent circum-
stance of the setting of an execution date.239 Setting an execution date 
on a forcibly medicated condemned inmate is tantamount to a state 
decision to cease to provide appropriate medical care to that inmate in 
contravention of its constitutional obligation to do so.240 
b. An Unethical Forcible Medication Regimen Constitutes Excessive Punishment 
Under the Eighth Amendment 
 In addition to compromising a physician’s ethical duties, a forcible 
medication program fundamentally distorts the condemned inmate’s 
experience of treatment, further calling into question whether such a 
program could ever be construed as medically appropriate.241 These 
distortions transform medication from a source of healing into a source 
of punishment that inflicts acute psychological distress and suffering.242 
A condemned inmate is not only forced to submit body and mind to 
powerful and invasive medications, but is also forced into an inequitable 
                                                                                                                      
238 Perry, 610 So. 2d at 753; see also Jenkins, supra note 60, at 177 (“Because the admini-
stration of drugs and the associated side effects are pursuant to the state’s attempt to con-
summate a punitive goal, it follows that the forcible administration of drugs falls under the 
protection of Eighth Amendment restrictions.”). Additionally, there is a concern grounded 
in legal realism that additional practical motives will be cited by the state as a mere pretext 
for forcible medication. See Bryan Lester Dupler, The Uncommon Law: Insanity, Executions, 
and Oklahoma Criminal Procedure, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 54 (2002) (“As a matter of candor and 
common sense, the long-term health (or ‘medical interest’) of the insane capital prisoner 
is not the concern of the State that seeks to forcibly medicate him.”); Roberta M. Harding, 
“Endgame”: Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 
105, 125 (1994) (“[T]here is a real risk that a state might cite an ‘appropriate’ reason for 
forcible medication, such as providing medical care as required by the Eighth Amend-
ment, while refusing to disclose the real reason, wanting to make the inmate death quali-
fied[.]”); Jenkins, supra note 60, at 177 (“Perry pointed out that the state could not credibly 
come forward with a request to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a death row 
inmate and claim the involuntary medication was in the inmate’s medical interest when 
the state has condemned the inmate to death.”). 
239 See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026; see also Entzeroth, supra note 58, at 658 (“The Eighth 
Circuit’s suggestion that the only ill effect of the forced administration of the medication is 
execution flies in the face of reality and common sense . . . .”). 
240 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) 
(establishing the state’s constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical treatment to 
a prison inmate). 
241 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768. 
242 See Entzeroth, supra note 58, at 657–59; Gardner, supra note 195, at 815–16; Jenkins, 
supra note 60, at 177. 
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situation where any positive response to medication will have the per-
verse effect of contributing to his ultimate doom.243 Additionally, be-
cause the treating physician ultimately acts contrary to core principles of 
medical ethics to end life rather than to promote long-term normative 
adjustment, this inmate is denied the benefit of a trusted and trustwor-
thy guide throughout the supposed recovery process.244 States contin-
ued cooption of the medical profession in this manner despite strong 
opposition from medical professionals is further troubling insofar as it 
indicates neglect of the evolving standards of decency incorporated into 
the ethical prescriptions of the medical and psychiatric communities.245 
 In Perry, the Louisiana Supreme Court ably articulated precisely 
why, implicit in the practice of medicating-to-execute, there is a vast 
potential for causing uniquely extreme physical and psychological pain 
to an inmate of fragile mental health.246 The court understood the 
practice to amount to an excessive punishment that offended basic 
principles of humanity: 
Rather than calling upon Perry to suffer only the extinguish-
ment of his life in a humane manner, the state would have 
him undergo a course of maltreatment that is inherently 
loathsome and degrading to his dignity as a human being. 
Unlike sane death row prisoners who retain dignity until the 
end, Perry would be forced to endure the usurpation of con-
trol of his body and mind by the state and the deprivation of 
medical treatment in his best interests before he is dispatched 
by the lethal injection. He must experience an indefinite pe-
riod of indignity, anxiety and fear, assimilating unwanted an-
tipsychotic drugs into his brain and body against his will at the 
                                                                                                                      
243 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768; see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1001, 1045 (1995) 
(noting that “one of the most horrible feelings” a prisoner can be subjected to is the un-
certainty during his long stay on death row) (quotation omitted). 
244 See Lerman, supra note 212, at 1975 (noting that physician participation in medicat-
ing-to-execute “violate[s] a deeply-rooted expectation that when patients place themselves 
in the hand of physicians, the physician will use her powers in a fashion consistent with her 
ethical obligations to her patient”). 
245 See Am. Coll. of Physicians et al., supra note 210, at 13 (explaining how, begin-
ning in the 1980s, the emerging use of lethal injections as states’ primary execution 
method prompted the U.S. medical community “to clarify its position on physician in-
volvement in executions, and to solidify its opposition to physician participation”); Ler-
man, supra note 212, at 1974 (noting that, because consensus against physician participa-
tion in execution exists “in the very community best equipped to judge the decency of 
these practices,” courts should consider these professional standards when evaluating 
evolving standards of decency). 
246 See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768. 
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risk of harmful and fatal side effects. He will go through this 
painful test involving his intimate mental and bodily processes 
without the aid of a trusted physician acting in his welfare and 
in whom he can confide. There is in this process of executing 
the death sentence no match, equivalence or proportionality. 
These circumstances amount to more than the mere extin-
guishment of life; they degrade human dignity and reach a 
sum in which there is something inhuman, barbarous, and 
analogous to torture.247 
 Indeed, incompetent inmates appear doomed to suffer a form of 
capital punishment that is qualitatively different from that suffered by 
inmates who retain their sanity on death row.248 Although the punish-
ment of execution is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth 
Amendment to the crime of deliberate murder, the line into unconstitu-
tionality is crossed when the pain and humiliation attendant upon a 
normal execution is increased sharply by preliminary subjection of an 
inmate to forced medication.249 Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that punishments that induce severe psychological 
strain can be impermissibly cruel.250 Subverting the purpose of medical 
intervention to facilitate execution disregards an inmate’s humanity, 
treating him instead as merely an object to be “toyed with and dis-
                                                                                                                      
247 Id. 
248 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. The logic behind the ban against the punishment of expa-
triation seems applicable to a death sentence which requires a forcible regimen of antipsy-
chotic medication followed by a “wait and see” period during which life and death is un-
certain: 
[The punishment of expatriation] is offensive to cardinal principles for which 
the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear 
and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, 
what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause 
his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to ban-
ishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condi-
tion deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to 
suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to 
bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
249 See id. at 100 (“While the State has the power to punish, the [Eighth] Amendment 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”). 
250 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 273–74 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 
101) (expatriation was deemed a “punishment more primitive than torture” because “it 
necessarily involve[d] a denial by society of the individual’s existence as a member of the 
human community”). 
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carded.”251 Although intense psychological strain is inherent in every 
execution, especially in light of the long period between sentencing and 
the actual execution, a state that forcibly medicates to facilitate execu-
tion is inflicting punishment “so degrading and indecent as to amount 
to a refusal to accord the criminal human status.”252 
2. Government Interest 
 Similar to the way it disregarded the question of medical ethics, 
the Eighth Circuit in Singleton also disregarded whether certain circum-
stances can mitigate the government’s interest in effecting a death sen-
tence.253 Rather, the court simply invoked an essential government in-
terest in carrying out a lawfully imposed sentence, positing further that 
“[s]ociety’s interest in punishing offenders is at its greatest in the nar-
row class of capital murder cases in which aggravating factors justify 
imposition of the death penalty.”254 The court deemed this government 
interest to override the condemned inmate’s liberty interest in being 
free from unwanted medication.255 According to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Sell, however, before the state may forcibly medicate an inmate 
to render him competent for trial, a finding that “important governmen-
tal interests are at stake” and a conclusion that “involuntary medication 
is necessary to further those interests” is required.256 The Sell Court pin-
pointed the government interest in bringing a criminal defendant to 
trial as the interest in “protect[ing] through application of the criminal 
law the basic human need for security.”257 Though it recognized this as 
an always-important government interest, it specifically rejected the 
conclusion that it would always be of enough importance to justify 
forcible medication; rather, it concluded certain circumstances could 
mitigate the government’s interest in prosecution.258 The potential for 
lengthy future confinement in the event that an inmate would not take 
drugs voluntarily was offered as a specific example of what might con-
stitute such a special circumstance.259 
                                                                                                                      
251 See id. at 273. 
252 See id. 
253 See 319 F.3d at 1025. 
254 Id. 
255 See id. 
256 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, 181. 
257 Id. at 180. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. (“[L]engthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill . . . would dimin-
ish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed 
a serious crime.”). 
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 By analogy, a court should not determine that the government’s 
interest in carrying out a death sentence will, in every case, be of such 
importance to justify forcible medication; rather, that government in-
terest may reasonably be mitigated by the special circumstance that an 
incompetent inmate’s commuted death sentence will invariably be re-
placed by a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role.260 Though failure to carry out a death sentence may deprive soci-
ety and the victim’s family of a measure of the retributive value of the 
original sentence,261 an inmate’s assured future of lifetime confinement 
substantially meets the government interest in protecting society and in 
providing harsh criminal punishment for heinous crimes while main-
taining respect for basic human dignity.262 
 In other words, imposition of a life sentence without parole ren-
ders the government interest in execution subordinate to the inmate’s 
significant liberty interest and the state’s own interest in preserving the 
integrity of the medical profession.263 Persisting in the imposition of a 
death penalty in the face of this subordinate government interest in 
punishment amounts to “the pointless infliction of suffering” in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.264 
                                                                                                                      
260 See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-904(c), (h)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2009). 
This is the approach adopted by Maryland. See id. 
261 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that 
instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose 
in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to 
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal 
offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of 
anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. 
Id. 
262 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (“By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, 
the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons.”). 
263 See supra notes 208–240 and accompanying text. 
264 See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103–04; Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
A punishment is excessive . . . if it is not necessary: The infliction of a severe 
punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is noth-
ing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly 
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the pun-
ishment is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore 
excessive. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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Conclusion 
 When a state seeks to forcibly medicate and then execute an oth-
erwise incompetent inmate, it exacts an unconstitutional punishment 
because the process cannot conform to the due process requirements 
for forcible medication established by the Supreme Court in Sell v. 
United States. Requiring that medication be both medically appropriate 
and necessary to further a sufficiently important government interest 
protects not only an inmate’s due process rights, but also an inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from disproportionate and unnec-
essary punishment. As soon as an inmate is scheduled for execution, a 
forcible medication regimen ceases to be medically appropriate and 
becomes simply a component of the capital punishment to be inflicted 
by the state. Furthermore, the government’s interest in execution is not 
strong enough to override both the inmate’s significant liberty interest 
and the state’s own interest in preserving the ethics of the medical pro-
fession, given that a sentence of execution would be replaced by a sen-
tence of life without the possibility of parole. Thus, when the govern-
ment seeks to forcibly medicate an inmate with antipsychotic drugs to 
facilitate that inmate’s execution, it inflicts punishment that is both 
disproportionate and unnecessary, and therefore cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
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